Anglinskaia volnost zdes ne u mesta ^*
Peter I

INTRODUCTION

To better understand the Russian empire and fate of Cossack-Ukraine it is useful to study them from a comparative perspective. Accordingly, this paper  compares Cossack-Ukraine and Russia with England and Scotland. In Scotland elite dissatisfaction over incorporation into Britain lingered for decades after the Act of Union of 1707, as did elite dissatisfaction in Cossack Ukraine with the Treaty of 1654. Backed by Bourbon France, the descendants of the deposed James VII Stuart and their supporters (Jacobites) staged five failed uprisings in the eighteenth century , the last of which  was mounted  in 1745. In 1746 a British force defeated the Jacobites' field army of 5,000 at the battle of Culloden and for months afterwards arbitrarily executed any commoner Highlanders it could find.¹ Similarly, Cossack-Ukraine posed a serious threat to tsarist Russia for the last time in 1709, and  its population also experienced terror at the hands of the Russian army. Both elites, subsequently, came to terms with the status quo.  Thus, few Scots or Ukrainians allied with the French when they had an opportunity to change borders and allegiances between 1792 and 1814. Scotland's leading writers, Walter Scott and Robert Burns, both volunteered to fight Revolutionary France in the 1790s, and in Ukraine (Malorossiia), the father of modern Ukrainian literature, Ivan Kotliarevsky, formed and led a cavalry regiment against Napoleon in 1812.² Until 1914, unlike the Poles or Irish, the Ukrainians and Scots staged no nationally inspired armed uprisings or terrorism against Petersburg or London. There was no Scottish Republican Army nor an Ukrainian equivalent of the Polish bojowki. The majority of the elite were loyalist in both countries.

But, by 1914, whereas the Scots had become a modern nation, Ukrainians remained an ethnographic mass.³ By 1900 six national boards in charge of social affairs and a coordinating Scottish Office in Edinburgh gave Scotland de facto autonomy. The country was industrialized, with 74 percent of its population living in towns of 1,000 people or more and over 75 percent literate.⁴ Landed Scottish families intermarried with their English counterparts and were assimilated into an imperial elite, but the Anglicized Scottish patrician remained assertively Scottish. As stated in an 1887 letter to the Times, a Scot could have two patriotisms and "be sensible of no opposition between them.⁵  In 1914 a Home Rule bill had reached second reading in Parliament, and wits, pointing to the Scottish nationality of so many ministers, wondered why the English were not demanding Home Rule (autonomy). By contrast, in 1897 the majority of the population in the six provinces that once were Cossack-Ukraine were illiterate, and only 18 percent of the population lived in towns of 2,000 people or more.⁶ These provinces had no distinct national institutions, and although they produced a considerable proportion of Russia's coal, steel, and cereals, their economy was not diversified. Most Ukrainians still used earthenware utensils, wooden tools and axles, and lived under straw roofs. The incidence of typhus, dysentery, and diphtheria among them was twice the rate in Central Russia. Landed Ukrainian families intermarried with Russian families and were assimilated into an imperial elite, but few of these Russified nobles maintained a practical interest in their native land. On the eve of World War 1, federalist demands were restricted to a group of nationalist intellectuals. Appropriately, Walter Scott never protested against the Union with England, nor was he ever arrested.  Taras Shevchenko condemned Bohdan Khmelnytsky for his treaty with Russia and was arrested for supporting the political restructuring of part of the Russian empire into a Slavic confederation.

THE ISSUES

Why by 1914 did Scots, despite being part of a larger English dominated state since 1707 and despite Anglicization, become a modern nation, while Ukrainians, who belonged to a larger Russian dominated state since 1654, and were subject to Russification, remain an ethnographic mass?  One important variable explaining the difference between these non-state nations is the nature of the states they belonged to. In Britain, laws limited the exercise of terror and guaranteed the existence of native institutions in Scotland. By the 20th century, as a result, ethnic identity and  regional patriotism evolved into a "civic nationalism" compatible with an imperial loyalism and continued membership in a multi-national state with considerable political autonomy. In the Russian empire, where there was no rule of law and the tsars abolished native institutions when they saw fit, ethnic identity and regional patriotism became the bases of a separatist “ethnic” political  nationalism.

At the outset it should be noted that  the contrast between constitutional Britain and autocratic Russia should not be  attributed to differences in wealth.  The western European legal tradition, to which Britain belongs, cannot be reduced to economics, since its origins go back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries - almost 600 years before northwestern Europe became wealthier than the rest of the world. Those centuries did see European prosperity, but periods of economic expansion in Russia did not result in similar laws on representation, contractual reciprocity, right of possession without ownership, nor limits to power.  Although  nationalist and   socioeconomic slants in  past  comparative imperial and nationality studies, and now  power-centered postmodernist accounts of colonial rule, have  led students to overlook  legal norms and how their presence or absence affected the fates of dominated European minorities, law  must not be ignored. Analogously, the role of law and institutions in the formation of nationality should not be ignored. Marxists, it should be noted, who assumed that law was only a tool of domination used by property holders to oppress the propertyless, also  ignored the fact that law could and did protect groups and individuals from the arbitrary use of power.⁷

This essay does not deny the importance of socioeconomic forces in imperial relationships and national histories. It seeks, rather, to put them into perspective by examining how laws and native institutions, or their absence, affected relations between the central governments and local elites in Britain and Russia after Charles Stuart in 1745 and Ivan Mazepa in 1709 failed in their bids to free Scotland and Cossack Ukraine from Hanoverian-English and Romanov-Russian rule.

ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND

Through the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the agricultural revolution divided Scotland into two parts. By the 1840s in the relatively prosperous southern Lowlands farming was based on private property, rents and tenants, while in the poorer Highlands much land was still given for use in return for service. Between 1755 and 1911, the total population rose from roughly 1.3 million to 4.8 million, while the percentage in the  Highlands fell from 20 percent to 8 percent. Lowlanders spoke Scots and, by the eighteenth century, English with a Scots accent. Highlanders spoke Gaelic into the nineteenth century. From 1609, Highland nobles were legally compelled to send their sons to English language schools, though few did until the end of the century. Gaelic was used for preaching and religious teaching from the sixteenth century and as a language of instruction in schools from 1826, but by 1850 Gaelic speakers were a shrinking minority. Although loyalists condemned it in the mid-eighteenth century as the “language of treason,” Gaelic was never formally proscribed.⁸

When James VI Stuart left Edinburgh for London with his court after signing a dynastic union in 1603, he ensured that Scotland and not England would be the periphery of the United Kingdom.⁹  A century later Scotland was not incorporated into England by a unilateral act of Parliament like Wales and Ireland, but was annexed by a negotiated compromise in the Treaty of Union. That treaty abolished two hitherto separate kingdoms and created Great Britain. London did not attempt to control Scotland by colonizing it with politically privileged settlers, not did it force the pace of integration. In return for their loyalty the English allowed the Scots to run their local affairs in the English manner, independent of centrally appointed officials. Besides a single parliament with seats reserved for Scots, freedom of trade, and Scottish access to English colonies, the Treaty provided for a separate Scottish legal and  administrative system, as well as an independent Presbyterian (Calvinist) Church. The scope and accomplishments of these non-centrally controlled institutions was profound. All countries had Church courts, for instance, but Scottish ones were exceptional for the number of cases they dealt with annually. All were run by local professionals, administered the same standards swiftly, and thus, before the appearance of modern secular government, urbanization and industrialization, were educating the disciplining the populace according to common Scottish rather than English norms.¹⁰ The two major Scottish officials after the Union were the Secretary for Scotland in London (to 1746) and the Lord Advocate (the chief law officer) in Edinburgh. Scotland may have become a "North Britain," its official title in the Act of Union, but it never became a "Little England" or a shire. The institutions secured in the Treaty generated judges, lawyers, clerks, teachers, and ministers, who  erected an invisible border with England, behind which,  the modern Scottish nation could be formed.

Cameralist and Enlightenment theories advocating centralist intervention and administrative uniformity had little influence on mainland Britain's political system, while the Quebec Act (1774) signaled the abandonment of efforts to build a uniform system of imperial government based on English institutions. A comparatively harsh English criminal law was mitigated by frequent jury acquittals resulting from a scrupulous concern with procedure. The Trials for Treason Act (1696), for instance, required voluntary confession in open court for a conviction. Detention without trial was rare; and suspension of Habeas Corpus, frequent but short-lived. Repressive legislation like the Riot Act, the Black Act, or the Septennial Act specified circumstances and behaviour precisely and were approved by Parliament. Territorially, the Franchise Act (1536) formally abolished autonomous jurisdictions yet, the powers of English local officials, conferred by Parliament and derived from Common Law, amounted to "self-government at the King's command." Once Cromwell’s and then Stuart attempts to centralize were defeated, the considerable authority that regional notables exercised through manorial courts, church assemblies, and patronage networks, would never again be threatened by central officials acting under royal decree. Ireland, exceptionally, was more a colony of England than a part of the British political realm. Parliament in 1719 specifically refused the terms of 1707 to Ireland, where English rule was based on a colony of privileged settlers and a centrally appointed viceroy. Since Catholics were barred from office throughout Britain until 1826, Ireland could not develop a local political elite nor forms of self-government.¹¹

Until 1828, when English ministries were introduced into Scotland, the country was a political dependency of the British government. Yet, Scots had access to imperial trade, the peerage, and to careers in London and the  empire. Merchants, bankers, and lawyers in Glasgow and Edinburgh counted their profits; while other Scots successfully took advantage of opportunities getting status and jobs in London, thanks to Scotland's superior educational system, and thereby provoking English hostility.¹² Alongside career considerations and the profits of empire, the idea that Scots and English were ethnically Teutonic and Saxon also fostered belief in a shared common British identity. Significantly, educated Scots disassociated their country's past from the notion of liberty, which they measured in terms of self-rule through modern institutions and laws, rather than in terms of historic privileges. They regarded independent Scotland as a kingdom that Union with England's progressive constitutional monarchy rescued from their "feudal" backwardness and lawlessness: "The North British periphery ... tended to assert its right to be anglicized more often than the freedom to be spared the interventions of central government."¹³ Alongside these centrifugal forces Scots enjoyed administrative devolution. In return for their clients' votes in Parliament, London ministers allowed the most powerful families to do as they pleased in Scotland through patronage and favorable legal decisions.¹⁴ Lay ministers, the Church's ideals of democratic involvement, and the fact that most civil magistrates were church elders, made the church and state distinction artificial in Scotland and meant that the local church councils, as well as the Church's General Assembly, composed only of Scots, played an important role in local administration alongside the courts.

Jacobites opposed to the Union included English gentry, Lowland Scots, Catholics, Episcopalians (Presbyterians with bishops), and clan rivals to the pro-English Campbell’s motivated as much by family interests as considerations of Stuart legitimacy. They  initially sought secession, but by 1745, they were prepared merely to revise the Union treaty. By 1789 the last Jacobites in Britain had reconciled themselves with the status quo. Neo Jacobites at the end of the nineteenth century stood for Parliament, demanded liberty for Scotland and Stuart restoration, but posed no political threat to Britain. The last time anyone was arrested for being a Jacobite was in 1817.¹⁵ Nineteenth-century Scots radicals tended to be anti-aristocratic democrats fighting for an egalitarian Britain alongside English radicals.

RUSSIA AND COSSACK-UKRAINE

Cossack-Ukraine emerged as a new political entity in 1649 whose borders after 1667 were coterminous with present-day eastern Ukraine. The Cossacks were a social group that never constituted more than half of the population in the country. Together with the territory of the Zaporozhian Army the region had a population of approximately two million in 1719 and 14 million in 1897 - or 60% of the population of tsarist Ukraine.¹⁶ The literary language was progressively Russified from the 1720s by tsarist legislation aimed at standardizing it with the Russian variant of Slaveno-Rusyn. The Church did not use vernacular Ukrainian to proselytize while the government proscribed that language from schools in 1804, and in 1863 and 1876 forbade publishing in it.

As of 1654, the Hetmanate was a protectorate of the tsar – a ruler whose powers were limited by custom, not written law. His prerogatives, unlike those of European monarchs, allowed him to tax, arbitrarily dispossess, arrest and execute any subject -- high-born or  common. Russian law specified that cases of treason and insurrection were to be dealt with administratively, that is, without due process. The highest judicial body in the Hetmanate was the General Military Court presided by General Judges. The Hetmanate was formally abolished in 1781, but prior to that, nine “agreements” renewing the Pereiaslav Treaty had effectively restricted to a minimal level its autonomy. Although seventeenth-century Russian historical writings treated the city of Kiev as “first capital of Russia” and the original seat of the ruling dynasty, the tsars did not use the opportunity provided by annexation of this "lost land" in 1654 to relocate their capital to its supposed original location. Thus, Ukraine, not Russia, became the periphery in the tsarist empire.

The tsars did not colonize Cossack lands and try to rule through politically privileged settlers but did force the pace of integration. The tsar was represented by Russian military governors (voievoda) and garrisons stationed in the major Ukrainian towns. In theory these officials, whose number varied according to political circumstance, concerned themselves only with military affairs. In practice, continuous wars intertwined daily life with military affairs and provided opportunities for the voievodas to extend tsarist authority beyond the limits considered acceptable by cossack leaders. Voievodas also extended their influence by arbitrating internal disputes and exploiting the rivalries of the leading cossack families.

Tsars invited Ukrainians north to help them administer their empire. The first to go were priests and monks whose education enabled them to quickly dominate church and intellectual life and provoke thereby the enmity of native Russian clerics.¹⁷ By the end of the eighteenth century, this trickle became a flow. Ukrainian noblemen made imperial careers and their noticeable success provoked complaints from their Russian counterparts about ubiquitous “Little-Russian opportunists” (Malorossiiska prolaza). Economic integration reinforced the tie to Russia.  Rising agricultural prices during the second half of the century  benefited cossack landowners, as did Catherine's introduction of serfdom in Ukrainian lands (1783) and her granting Russian noble status to all cossack officers (1785).¹⁸ Russian officers, administrators, and merchants, who had no political privileges to distinguish them from Ukrainians, averaged 10 percent of the male population by the mid-nineteenth century. As in Scotland, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment idea of progress and civilization led some educated Ukrainians to associate their native past and "cossack rights" with anarchy and lawlessness, and the larger political unit to which they belonged with reason and order. These men, who also believed that Ukrainians and Russians were ethnically related, sought central intervention in their internal affairs and thought the imperial centralization that followed the abolition of the Hetmanate and its institutions benefited their country.¹⁹

Cossack-Ukraine posed a serious threat to the tsars for the last time in 1709, when Ivan Mazepa failed in his attempt to secede from Russia in alliance with Charles XII.²⁰ To ensure that no future Hetman would again risk separating the Hetmanate from Russia, Peter I condoned  a campaign of terror as part of his response. After Mazepa's death, his followers maintained their separatist position in emigration and, like the Jacobites, solicited support from the Bourbons.²¹ As the political significance of culture and language increased during the nineteenth century, those who wanted to repress Ukrainian national activists, warned ministers that Russia's continental rival, Austria-Hungary, would use these activists to foment internal instability.²² Ukrainian nationalists, for their part, claimed the legacy of the Cossack Hetmanate and from mid-century were arrested and harassed. Unlike their Mazepist precursors, they based their demands for autonomy and, later, independence on the right of nations to self-determination rather than on legal-historical arguments. Ukrainian nationalists had no strong political organizations before 1914  nor any links with foreign powers. Ukrainian-born radicals did tend to join Russian political parties that aimed to transform the empire into a socialist egalitarian society.

SCOTLAND AFTER CULLODEN

Strong anti-Scottish sentiment in 1745-46 included the suggestion that all Jacobite women of childbearing age be slaughtered, while the commander of British troops in Scotland, Lord Cumberland, sent London a draft proclamation, after Culloden, that required arbitrary confiscations and executions for suspected rebels. Policy did not reflect these extremes, however, and the government did little more before the battle than suspend  Habeas Corpus and order local justices to arrest papists. The Scottish Lord Justice pointed out to the King and the Prime Minister that the government's opposition to the Stuarts had to be presented as the defense of the right to life, liberty, and property by due process of law as established after 1688. He accordingly reworded Cumberland's draft to specify that those under suspicion of treason would be punished to the full extent of the law. Cumberland, for his part, thought that legal constraints merely protected rebels who would rise again if they were not destroyed. He therefore ignored instructions not to "give any just cause of complaint to a country so ill disposed to the king and so willing to find fault with everything that is done for His Majesty's service.”²³ He allowed his troops to kill the wounded after the battle and punitive detachments in the months afterwards to massacre hundreds of non-combatants. Among the chief perpetrators, notably, were Lowland Scots. Charles’s army lost approximately 1500 dead. There are no exact figures of the number of non-combatants killed afterwards but a possible maximum of 1,000 dead would represent 4 percent of the Highland population.²⁴ Cumberland knew that basis of Jacobite threat were the land laws that allowed great Scots lords to raise private armies and that is what he sought to destroy. He wanted expanded powers to permit him to launch reprisals on a large scale that would include non- combatants. But, he also knew, “military execution” and random destruction of homes  could not be justified legally in Britain.  Ministers eventually passed a bill relieving their soldiers in Scotland of criminal responsibility, but the point is that all involved  knew they could not ignore the law.²⁵   

In 1746 Scotland was blockaded. Even though the 9,000 regular troops who occupied the Highlands had a commander who condoned punitive excesses, the government did not use this overwhelming concentration of force (1 soldier to 29 people) to exploit the Highlands economically nor to abrogate self-rule by posting English governors in Scotland. Of the 3,470 arrested as Jacobites and prosecuted, the government executed 120 (of which 40 were deserters caught in rebel ranks) and pardoned or released 1,363. Forty-one individuals were declared traitors by Parliament (Act of Attainder) and subject to execution on sight.²⁶ Political measures directed against the Highlands were formulated in six bills drawn up by English ministers of which the most contentious sought to abolish the Heritable Jurisdictions: inviolable crown grants of judicial authority to landowners that made them kings on their estates—where they distributed land to tenants for service. This was the last of three instances of major legislation that impinged on Scotland but was not initiated in Scotland. Loyalist Scots who opposed the measure on the grounds that it contravened the Union did not mount a sustained protest, so the bill was subsequently modified and passed without expressly repealing the Jurisdictions. All the officials and agencies in charge of its implementation were Scottish, however; and the expressed purpose of the bill was to promote commerce and manufacturing in the Highlands. It provided full rights for owners to exploit their land as they saw fit and directed the money from confiscated estates into development projects. Commoners suffered, but most educated Scots supported these measures, which both raised incomes and corresponded to their attitudes on development and improvement.²⁷

Thanks to French support, Jacobites  posed a threat to London up to 1759, until which time they continued partisan-style operations against the British army in north-western Scotland.²⁸  Despite this threat, however, few major landowners were tried and dispossessed for Jacobitism after Culloden. Those who were, benefited from amnesty granted in 1752. In 1784 the government returned all confiscated estates to their families.²⁹ London abolished the Secretary for Scotland in 1746, yet even some Jacobites approved because they thought this office gave too much power to one man, even if he were a Scot.³⁰ With the defeat of the French, London began withdrawing its army and by 1780 there were fewer regular troops in Scotland than in Ireland, and most of those who remained were companies from the Invalid Regiment -- veterans 46 to 79 years old. From a maximum of 3,000 (a ratio of 1 soldier per 433 people in the general population, and 1 soldier to 87 people in the Highlands, where 7 percent of the army was stationed) in 1769, the number fell to 1: 745 in 1774.³¹ In 1756, faced with the outbreak of the Seven Years War and no other source of recruits, the government decided to  allow recruiting of Scots en masse into the British army where they fought in  separate Highland regiments. Highland nobles, for their part, eagerly  served less because of  a desire to prove their loyalty after Culloden, than to get pay and status as officers and recruiters.³²  

England's rulers in 1745, who thought Charles Stuart would restore Catholic Church lands, repudiate the national debt, raise taxes, and surrender English commercial interests to Spain and France, probably feared losing Scotland less than losing their fortunes. The government, accordingly, took stem measures against Jacobites and their suspected supporters after 1746. But, it did not treat Scotland as harshly as Ireland which, from 1699, was garrisoned continuously with 12,000 regular troops and where repression was legitimized by the continuous renewal of the Coercion Acts, which created a vicious cycle of oppression and resistance. Despite rebellions, in short, London still left Scots to manage their own affairs.

Fear that Jacobites would invade again with French help  was one mitigating influence  after Culloden, just as fear of continental intervention in Ireland influenced policy there. Cumberland, eager to get his army to Flanders as soon as possible,  proposed an amnesty to  Jacobite leaders that they  refused because they thought French aid was forthcoming. Repression was also cut-short by London’s need for Scottish manpower with the outbreak of the Seven Years War. Another  reason for restraint  put forward by those who advocated moderation in dealing with Scotland during those years  was internal. It would be wise, they argued,  to reconcile with as many as possible since, besides the French link,  Jacobites enjoyed considerable lowland and middle-class support. During the campaign there were more than twice as many Scots in Jacobite ranks as in Cumberland's force, and, while no more than 46 percent of Charles's army were Highlanders, 80 percent of his officers were Lowlanders.  London ministers, additionally, were inclined to listen to moderates because they  realized that, except for exclusion from London patronage, there had been little reason for poor  Highland lords to prefer a Jacobite pretender to George II.³³ No less significant was the idea among the European educated that there were rules of war  prohibiting  atrocities, and leaders’ wishes to be seen as following those rules. Breaches were regular, but from the sixteenth century the educated  subjected them to scrutiny, condemned them, and would even attempt to enact legal sanctions – which leaders preferred to avoid.³⁴  Finally, powerful loyalists like the Scottish Lord Justice pointed out in the press and Parliament that not all Scots were Jacobites threatening "English Freedoms," and reminded the king and his ministers that law mattered in a constitutional monarchy.

As the initial Scottish opposition to the 1707 Union subsided, most of the educated elite adopted the view that pre-Union “backwardness” had oppressed the people and that association with England was the best way to rectify their lot benevolently. Scots influenced by Enlightenment ideals felt humiliated by allusions to their supposed backwardness vis a vis the English, and came to associate liberty and prosperity with Union, government intervention, and Anglicization, rather than local rights or self-determination. From the 1720s Scots eagerly began to borrow from England what they thought was best to improve their country. This included the rights of the English country gentlemen who ran local government, were represented in Parliament, and were answerable only to the law and not powerful landlords or monarchs. Some of the powerful did feel left out of the distribution of favours and offices after 1707, but even they were not excluded from these English rights and found it easier to become loyal subjects after Culloden than did rebel colonial Americans, who thought themselves unjustly excluded by the government from the English rights enjoyed by the king's subjects in Britain.³⁵

By the mid-eighteenth century, the political class on both sides of the border accepted  that Scottish association with England would be based on devolved administration as defined by the Union Treaty. Individuals continued to differ on the question of whether all or parts of the Act of Union were Fundamental Law unalterable by ordinary legislation and who, if anyone, could change that law. On this point loyalist Scots, prepared in principle to Anglicize institutionally and culturally, resolutely maintained that only they, not Parliament, had the right to amend or annul the 1707 Treaty. The issue first emerged in 1713, when a motion to abolish the Union was rejected on the grounds that Parliament did not have the necessary authority.³⁶

Regardless of the revisions made to the Union Treaty before and after Culloden, it was not English members of Parliament, but Scottish gentry, officers, clergy, teachers, and lawyers, working within the native Scottish institutions guaranteed by the British constitutional monarchy, who  controlled the pace of assimilation, unification, and economic development in their own country. Thanks to the continued existence of their church, parish schools, legal system and  municipal boroughs, all of which predated industrialization,  educated Scots were able to create the modern Scottish nation. Faced with London’s demand for troops between 1756 and 1815, Scots emphasized the martial nature of  Highland clan system and thus, added a distinctive military aspect to the civilian institutional aspects of their  national identity. Anglicization and imperial glory for the Scottish elite, thus, remained compatible with the political and economic interests of their native land, and every articulate Scot in imperial or British service on at least one occasion would "firmly and generally approvingly describe himself as a Scot."³⁷

UKRAINE AFTER POLTAVA

Within a week of  Mazepa's defection in October 1708, Peter declared  the duties and taxes he had imposed while Hetman null and void.³⁸  More resolute measures to keep Ukrainian loyalty were carried out by  Alexandr Menshikov who  took the  capital of Baturyn. He razed it to the ground, and viciously slaughtered an estimated maximum of  6 000 of its  inhabitants, 6 -7000 captured cossack soldiers,  and approximately 1000 people in surrounding villages. Shortly afterwards, Peter learned that five of the ten cossack regiments remained loyal to him and knew that, according to rumour, Mazepa, after seeing the disastrous condition of the Swedish army, had advised his supporters to accept an amnesty.  During the next weeks a portion of his supporters duly left.³⁹ By 1709 Mazepa had only his mercenary troops – later joined by a few thousand zaporozhians.  Perhaps the Hetman thought that the absence from the Swedish camp of regular Hetmanate troops  would save their lands and families from Peter’s wrath. Perhaps it did, as in 1709 Peter turned south. That spring, a Russian force destroyed the Zaporozhian Cossack stronghold on the Dnieper river as punishment for joining Mazepa, executed 300 prisoners, and then massacred as many as another 1 000 people in a nearby settlement. Peter ordered all Zaporozhian Cossacks to be executed on sight. He decreed that anyone suspected of associating with Mazepa and the Swedes in any manner was to have their property confiscated and that informers were to be rewarded with the goods of their victims. Field court martials convicted suspected Mazepa sympathizers on the basis of evidence obtained from denunciations or given under torture. Since there was no legal definition of political crime, presiding officials, or Peter himself, decided what was treason. The most notorious tribunal was at  tsarist headquarters in Lebedyn. There are no reliable figures on the total number executed but it is thought to be in the hundreds.⁴⁰  Repression continued well after the battle. In 1711, in an attempt to deny a recruiting base to exiled pro-Mazepa cossacks, Russian troops forcibly resettled approximately 100,000 people east of the Dnieper river, which was almost one-half of the population in an area of some 35,000 square kilometers along the Hetmanate's western border.⁴¹    

Thus, before the battle of  Poltava, Peter created a climate of terror in the Hetmanate by promoting denunciations and witch-hunts and  by slaughtering  perhaps a maximum of 15 000 non-combatants– almost  1 percent of the Hetmanate population including hundreds of  prisoners summarily executed. According to one unsubstantiated contemporary Russian estimate, in the eight months between the sack of Baturyn and the Poltava battle, as many as 30 000 cossacks and non-combatant Ukrainians died at Russian hands. All 2700 cossacks who surrendered after the battle of Poltava were spared, but were reduced in status to peasants, while their officers were exiled.⁴² By comparison, as noted, of the 3470 Jacobite prisoners in English hands in 1746,  only 161 were executed, and almost one-third were released.

In  brutal times when armies had more than their share of  brutal men, it is difficult to judge the behaviour of  Peter’s troops in Cossack-Ukraine. Was the slaughter there more horrific than the slaughter after Culloden? Can levels of violence at all be compared?  Historians perhaps should simply note the following considerations. First, by 1708 Peter’s  policies had so alienated senior cossack officers that there hardly existed a pro-Russian faction among them any longer. Consequently,  desperation could have reinforced Peter’s inclination to rely on terror as a means to keep Ukrainians loyal.⁴³ Second, there is no evidence Peter personally ordered massive slaughter of non-combatants.  Upon learning of Mazepa’s defection, Peter stipulated in a manifesto to Cossack officers that anyone who joined the Hetman would be considered a traitor, dispossessed, and his family exiled.  Those captured, as traitors “will be mercilessly punished by death (kazneny budut smertiu bez poshchady). Peter actually ordered Baturyn to be only burned - down  (Zzhet ves)  after he heard it had been taken, but before he knew what Menshikov had done. In light of Peter’s orders to mercilessly punish Bulavin’s supporters,  however, he most probably condoned Menshikov’s butchery.  In letters he wrote after he had undoubtedly learned of the Baturyn massacres, he  warned others that disobedience would bring them the same fate as Baturyn.⁴⁴ Third, there is no indication of any concern about laws or ethics in the correspondence between Menshikov and Peter, or any other of his associates, as may be found in the letters that went back and forth between Cumberland and London in 1745-46. There is no mention of having to prove someone a traitor in court before punishing them. There was no public backlash against Menshikov’s actions comparable to what  occurred in England against massacres in Scotland (indeed there was hardly a “public” in the English sense in Russia at all), nor any evidence of anyone in Russia  urging restraint. Documents refer only to Peter offering amnesty to any who surrendered, and to a personal assurance from Prince Golitsyn, who was in charge of Peter's foreign affairs, to the new Hetman, Ivan Skoropadsky, that no one would be convicted on the basis of false denunciations. As noted by one Russian historian, “Peter was convinced that in the name of the state’s aims many moral norms could be ignored.”⁴⁵  Russia, in short,  was not Britain, where soldiers and officials were liable to private prosecution for using excessive force.⁴⁶ In Russia there were no institutions or laws, or public opinion that might have obliged Peter or any of his commanders to restrain  or  moderate their tactics against Ukrainians, and accordingly, more innocent non-combatants suffered than might have otherwise.⁴⁷

After the Great Northern War ended, Peter severely curtailed Hetmanate autonomy and  permanently billeted 20 dragoon and garrison regiments on its population. In 1725, almost twenty years after Poltava, and with no apparent foreign threat, Cossack Ukraine still maintained approximately 25,000 troops (1 soldier per 80 people), or 13 percent of the imperial army.⁴⁸ Peter was the first tsar to distribute local  land and offices to non-Ukrainians, who thereafter were subject only to him, not the Hetman. He put two of his dragoon regiments in Ukraine under the direct command of a Russian general delegated to provide personal supervision of the Hetman and all his appointments. In 1722 he placed the Hetmanate  under the jurisdiction of the Senate and refused to allow the election of a new Hetman. The next year he summarily arrested a delegation of Cossack officers who had petitioned him to restore their country’s  autonomy, and introduced imperial Russian legal procedures into all Hetmanate courts. From 1728 three of the six judges in the Supreme Court had to be Russians. Formally charged with overseeing the proper implementation of local law, these judges had the authority to apply Russian law in cases in which they thought that Ukrainian legal provisions were either inapplicable or dated. The tsar's centralist mercantilist economic policies included predatory measures specifically directed against Hetmanate trade and manufacturing.⁴⁹  After Peter died, the government rescinded some of his decrees and permitted the election of a new Hetman. It did not issue an amnesty, return lands to any Mazepist family, nor channel any confiscated wealth into economic development. From 1727, Ukrainians no longer participated in the preparation of the legal act that defined their autonomy, and by the end of the century non-Ukrainians controlled most of the remaining urban commerce and manufacturing.

In eighteenth-century Russia, nobles had privileges of, but no inviolable rights to, representation, life, liberty, and property. Tsarist power was not limited by estate assemblies, and dealings with the Hetmanate were not restricted by formal treaty stipulations. Insofar as Russian envoys to Khmelnytsky in 1654 claimed that they had not sworn to abide by the Pereiaslav Treaty in the name of the tsar, tsarist officials could interpret Ukraine's status as one of unilateral submission. Since its allegiance was deemed unconditional, the Hetmanate had no rights, only granted privileges which the sovereign could revoke or change at will.⁵⁰

Catherine II justified her policies of centralization in these terms and by reference to Enlightenment theories of government. Once she learned that London's refusal to extend English rights and liberties to its American subjects provoked them to rebel, moreover, she may have concluded that pre-1776 English-American relations provided practical proof of the wisdom of  extending metropolitan privileges and practices to peripheral elites on generous terms in order to maintain stability and promote uniformity.⁵¹ Catherine thus abolished the Hetmanate and its court (1784) on the grounds that the Pereiaslav Treaty was not a contract. At the same time, by granting cossack officers the right to apply for cheap loans from the imperial Noble Bank in 1783 and extending to them the 1785 Charter of the Nobility, Catherine made it  easy for the Ukrainian elite to reconcile itself to the abolition of their separate institutions.

By 1795 Catherine had also dissolved the Hetmanate's army and transferred the remaining Ukrainian military unit, the Black Sea Cossack Army, to the Kuban region. Unlike the English, who allowed Scottish regiments to adopt a stylized Highland dress, the Russians ordered the ex-Zaporozhians to shave their distinctive scalp locks and dress in the Cherkassian, rather than the "Little Russian," style. Similarly, the Azov Cossack Army (1828 -65), made up of Zaporozhian cossacks and their descendants, as well as the standing regiments in the Ukrainian provinces after 1800, did not wear nationally distinctive uniforms. In so far as nineteenth-century  Ukrainian national identity had a martial aspect, unlike the Scottish, it was unofficial and existed only in memory.⁵²  Also, unlike British kings, who by 1712 trusted the Scots enough to garrison Scots Guards in London as part of the Household Brigade, the tsars had doubts about Ukrainians. A squadron of Black Sea Cossacks attached to the Imperial Guard to serve as a personal escort to the sovereign in 1811 was disbanded in 1855.

Eager to show Europe that her country was not barbarous, Catherine, in her most important legislative document, the Nakaz of 1767, remarked that she was not a despotic autocrat because she would not arbitrarily modify her proposed Fundamental Law that was to be equally applied to all nobles.⁵³  But she did not include territorial autonomy within her notion of Fundamental Law, nor was she influenced by Montesquieu's opinion that privileged groups with unequal rights constitute a necessary check on royal despotism.  She instead took to heart his admonition against different laws in empires for the government and the subject peoples, because he thought that would be inherently unstable. Even so,  in her theoretical ruminations, she left open the possibility that local privileges could be categorized as injunctions or regulations, rather than as laws, thereby retaining the prerogative of "legally" changing or annulling those privileges at will.⁵⁴

Among the leading thinkers from whom Catherine picked and chose her ideas was William Blackstone- one volume of whose Commentaries on the Laws of England was translated into Russian by Ukrainian-born Semen Desnytsky, a graduate of Glasgow University and the first professor of Law at Moscow University. In his introduction, Blackstone deals with the "countries subject to the Laws of England," and his description of Wales perhaps influenced Catherine's policy to the Hetmanate: "By other subsequent statutes their provincial immunities were still further abridged, but the finishing stroke to their independence was given by the statute 27 Henry VIII c. 26 which at the same time gave the utmost advancement to their civil prosperity by admitting them to a thorough communication of the laws with the subjects of England." Blackstone specified that the Scottish Church remained independent in Britain, but someone ignorant of the power of the Lord Advocate and the devolved nature of British administration could have construed from his account that Scotland was much more dependent on London after 1707 than it was in reality.⁵⁵ Thus, Catherine might have thought  that her borderland policies were not much different from those that the British constitutional monarchy, so idealized by some at the time, supposedly enacted in its Celtic borderlands.

Since the tsarist prerogative was unlimited by laws or institutions, what actually determined the Hetmanate's status was the power of Russia's rivals. As long as Sweden, Poland, and Turkey posed a threat to Russia and the cossacks represented an important military force, Ukraine could realistically threaten to ally with one of Russia's rivals and secede unless its autonomy was respected. To forestall this possibility, the tsars were obliged to respect Ukrainian particularities. Thus, Peter did not formally change Ukraine's political status until after the Treaty of Nystadt (1721). Catherine abolished the Hetmanate and then destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich only after a successful war against Turkey (1774) had pushed its borders back to the southern shores of the Black Sea.

Cossack leaders up to and including Mazepa did not share the tsars' interpretation of the Pereiaslav Treaty and regarded their relations with Russia as contractual. The cossacks were prepared to render allegiance only for so long as the tsar was prepared to defend their country and respect its rights, and they saw themselves as being legally entitled to seek a new sovereign if the tsar infringed upon their privileges and autonomy. In 1659 Hetman Vyhovsky had already responded to the tsar's attempt to increase arbitrarily the number of military governors in the Hetmanate by using such an argument to justify his attempt to secede from Muscovy.⁵⁶ This understanding of liberty in terms of privileges vis-a-vis the monarch can be found later in the writings of Montesquieu and Diderot, who argued that particularist privileges represented necessary checks on the royal will and that attempts to alter or abolish them amounted to tyranny.

LOYALISM AND PATRIOTISM BEFORE 1832

After 1709 the Ukrainian elite made no other serious attempts to separate, yet their political autonomy was progressively eroded. In Britain, on the contrary, Scotland retained its autonomy despite continuing support for Jacobites. Whereas the Scots after Culloden could still interpret the Union Treaty as they saw fit, Ukrainian cossack leaders after Poltava had to profess publicly that they accepted the Pereiaslav Treaty as one of unilateral submission. The arrest for treason in the 1760s of some who did not submit presumably intimidated others and reminded them of Peter's wrath.⁵⁷

Ukrainians and Scots had rights and privileges as members of supranational imperial elites and saw nothing "unpatriotic" in seeking assimilation into this elite. But, Peter's terror, the restrictions he placed on Hetmanate institutions, and Catherine's later abolition of them, made post-1709 loyalist politics in tsarist Little Russia very different from  post-1746 loyalist politics in North Britain. On one hand, "unconditional loyalists" in both countries regarded particularities as anachronistic obstacles to the government's regulation of society or as anarchic relics of a barbaric past incompatible with progress, monarchal sovereignty, and imperial unity. Such men opposed devolution in principle and, beyond sponsoring clients for office occasionally, did little to promote the regional interests of their homeland in the imperial capital.

On the other hand, "conditional loyalists" in both countries asserted group or territorial interests. Scots, for their part, complained that the English did not share the Scottish view of the Union as a partnership of two "British nations," were reluctant to recognize Scots as political equals, and as a result tried to exclude Scots from reforms by enacting them only in England. Scots vigorously protested they were loyal and should be included whenever they perceived such an exclusion. Scots also opposed government proposals that they thought  in violation of the Union if these measures were  proposed by ministers in London, rather than by Scots in Scotland. In both cases, Scots worked through the institutions guaranteed by the Union, which thus kept them and a notion of Scotland alive and relevant.⁵⁸ Eighteenth-century Ukrainian cossack officers similarly resented a Russian assumption of superiority.  They claimed that such attitudes should not sway a truly just tsar who would not arbitrarily overrule native institutions and traditions because Little Russia joined the empire voluntarily and its people were ethnically related to Russians. Such men kept alive the contractual interpretation of the Treaty of Pereiaslav by alluding to it in unpublished manuscript histories of their country. They also tried to resist the extension of central control over the Hetmanate within the parameters of the tsarist paternalist state and the theory of unilateral submission of the Treaty.

However, Ukrainian “conditional loyalists" after 1721 were weaker politically than their Scottish counterparts after 1746. First, Ukrainians had to base their activity on the official view that the Hetmanate's particularities and liberties were privileges recognized by grace, not rights based on law. Second, they had no access to presses nor a single central representative assembly in which they could make their case publicly; and their native civil institutions were all abolished by 1785. Third, memories of 1709 obliged spokesmen to be extremely circumspect when presenting their case. Their politics were restricted, consequently, to swaying opinion in Petersburg by exploiting client-kinship networks. Conditional loyalists could only argue that, because the autonomy and privileges of loyal cossacks were compatible with tsarist sovereignty in the past, these should be maintained, not arbitrarily replaced by novel institutions and practices derived from foreign models.⁵⁹ After Peter I's death, conditional loyalists requested each new monarch to restore graciously earlier privileges and autonomy. These were either recognized or not, in whole or in part, depending on circumstances and the balance of forces at court. In 1832 a committee decided against granting what was to be the last such request "for the good of the empire, whose unity and might is preserved under the protection of the autocracy, division into independent parts, or more correctly into a federal union of provinces with their own rights, cannot be allowed."⁶⁰ The last vestige of Ukraine's legal autonomy disappeared in 1843, when the Lithuanian Statute was abolished.

LOYALISM AND NATIONALITY AFTER 1832

The British Reform Act (1832) extended the vote to businessmen and professionals without challenging the landed gentry in the countryside. This act extended political influence to the two social groups that dominated and ran everyday affairs in the cities and obliged the new political parties to be sensitive to Scottish opinion. The expansion of government begun in the 1840s led to the formation of a distinct educational system, extensions in Scotland of English agencies and ministries, and to concerns about efficient administration that  culminated in a Scottish Office (1885) and calls for political autonomy (Home Rule). By the end of the century, although Scotland's boards and departments were part of a central government administration, they exercised Scottish control over Scottish affairs and were the agencies of a new middle class that had taken over self-government from the aristocrats. Semi-autonomy provided favourable conditions for Scottish capitalism and economic improvement; and, since loyalism continued to bring tangible benefits, those who mattered in Scotland had little interest in the separatist political nationalism.⁶¹ Literate Anglicized Scots living in a political system that brought material prosperity to Scotland, while allowing it a separate  law, church, administration, and educational system, could become a modern nation peacefully. London did not repress cultural nationalists, who did not oppose Union before World War 1, while, after the 1830s, the legal distinction between seditious libel and seditious conspiracy meant that few radicals of any sort could be subject to arrest. Ministers were unconcerned about the erection of monuments to Wallace (1270-1305), a symbol of anti-English resistance, and never legislated against Gaelic or Scots. In any case, by the nineteenth century, few Gaelic- speakers, and the fact that Scottish romantics imagined their Highland heroes as English -speakers, meant that language could not have the same symbolic importance to Scottish as to other nationalisms.

In 1822, as part of a ministerial strategy to counter the influence of radical ideas that two years earlier had provoked the Radical War, George IV visited Scotland dressed in a kilt, feather bonnet, and tartan. He thereby gave official legitimacy to items of clothing hitherto identified with rebellious Highlanders and treasonous Jacobites. Politically safe, socially acceptable, and fashionable, this clothing  became a symbol of Scotland.⁶² This event, alongside Walter Scott's popular romantic novels about the Highlands, transformed Jacobitism from a movement that  threatened London with a call for liberty in a revised Union under native kings, into an acceptable element of loyalist Scottish identity. Gaelic-speaking Highlanders, meanwhile, called "bare-arsed bandits" sixty years earlier and systematically evicted from their farms during the first half of the nineteenth century to make room for sheep, now became celebrated tragic heroes. The power of this loyalist  Britannic-Scots nationalism was shown in 1857 when the first modern nationalist group, the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights, dissolved itself four years after its formation.⁶³

In 1914 the nobility was still the most important social group in Russia, and the few professionals and entrepreneurs had only begun to win political influence. The centralized Ministry of the Interior did not delegate authority to its regional branches and retained rights of control and veto over local bodies that were allowed to exist after 1861. Political parties remained illegal until 1905. The judiciary was partially separated from the executive in 1864, but Russia remained a country in which no distinction was made between a decree or regulation and a law. All administrators were deemed personally responsible to the tsar, and according to paragraph 47 of the Code, laws "emanated from the power of the sovereign." In contrast to western European governments which employed selective and limited repression internally only against radicals who committed acts of violence, tsarist ministers enacted the 1881 Security Law against domestic radicals. Applied throughout the empire, this law allowed governors to exile arbitrarily anyone even suspected of an undefined "political unreliability" for up to five years.⁶⁴ The Fundamental Law of 1905  did not prevent the tsar from ruling by executive fiat.

The history of the Ukrainian nobility has yet to be written. Among the subjects needing research are questions such as how many nobles in Ukraine were involved with the national movement either as patrons or participants and how many tried to modernize their estates rather than work in administration. Which of those in service sponsored countrymen into positions and tried covertly or overtly to influence the implementation of policy in their home provinces? Were there client networks and informal factions that advanced or protected regional interests? Ukrainians held at least half of the local offices in their native provinces up to 1914, and although these were under the authority of central ministries at all levels, local "Ukrainian interests" could influence policies during implementation. Finally, what impact did regional associations have on development and what was their relationship to the traditional elite and the national movement?⁶⁵

On the basis of what is known, it seems that by the mid-nineteenth century few noble conditional loyalists remained. Memories of Peter's terror had faded, and the grandchildren of the last cossack officers seemed to be pleased with their privileges. In 1817, a travelling Russian observed: "The Rozumovskys, the Zavadovskys, the Bezborodkos and many others were powerful [Ukrainian-bom] magnates influential at court. But judging from the present conditions of Little Russia one cannot see that anyone of them cared about the advantages of his country and improved her lot. It seems that a happy man forgets everything except himself and that for fortune's sake any country becomes a fatherland."⁶⁶ With approximately 40 percent of the entire imperial nobility in government service and no more than 20 percent registered as full-time landowners by 1900, the overall position of nobles was worse in Russia than in Britain and the apparent indifference of the Russified Ukrainian nobility to its native country stood in stark contrast to the involvement of the Anglicized Scottish nobility in Scotland.

Throughout the nineteenth-century the relationship between Ukrainian national identity and imperial loyalism varied.  Tsarist officials hostile towards any manifestations of Cossack-Ukrainian institutional-legal particularism, tolerated and even supported “Little Russian” cultural nationalism for its anti-Polish value in the early nineteenth century. Because of the increasing appeal of nationalism, however, ethno-cultural as opposed to institutional-legal criteria of national identity, took on a political aspect among the new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals of the 1840s. Belonging to a people that no longer had distinct laws or civil institutions, these men inevitably built their definition of  “Ukrainian” on ethno-linguistic criteria: the peasant customs and vernacular that by then were the most important traits that distinguished Ukrainians from the rest of the tsars subjects. Had ministers listened to moderates and  continued supporting Ukrainian national activists in their attempts to create a literary version of the Ukrainian vernacular through to the end of the century, and not worried about how those activists interpreted their regional history, the result would probably have been a loyalist version of Ukrainian nationalism compatible with imperial Russia. But that did not happen.  Instead, the hard-liners  swung ministers and the tsars to their way of thinking. The decisive turning point came in 1847.  Then, in the 1860 and 70s, ministers apprehensive over the violence perpetrated by revolutionary Polish nationalists and radical socialists, overrode those who argued that the loyalty of minorities would be better won by accommodating differences, than by repression.

Admittedly, in 1832, for the first time since the seventeenth century, the tsarina appeared at court wearing a Muscovite costume, and Nicholas  did not take the opportunity of a trip to Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkiv that year to win the hearts of the local inhabitants by dressing like a Hetman – a token gesture that would have signaled the acceptability of a romanticized cossack identity to the ruling dynasty. Against this, one must consider that “Official Nationality” had not yet been adopted as policy nor had its proponent, Sergei Uvarov, been appointed  minister. Leading Ukrainians were still well connected at court. Gogol in particular, having just become the rage with his Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka, was close to the royal tutor, V. A. Zhukovskyi, as well as to a maid of honour, Alexandra Smirnov, of whom Nicholas was immensely fond. Thanks to her intervention he allowed the publication and performance of The Inspector General. Ukrainian subject matter, particularly the work of Gogol, was popular among the Russian reading public. Ukrainian nobles still adorned their salons and dining rooms with portraits of the pro-tsarist Hetmans. The remaining cossacks had just received a number of favourable decisions concerning their status; and in the wake of the Polish Revolt, educated Ukrainians and Russians shared a strong anti-Polish sentiment. ⁶⁷

This favourable conjuncture dissolved in 1847 when, the chief of police, fearing that the interest in folklore and regional history could foster separatist sentiment, ordered the arrest of the leading members of the first modern Ukrainian nationalist organization, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood.⁶⁸ When cultural-national issues again became politically important in the 1860s, official attitudes had hardened. In 1862 the tsar forbade a sculptor from including Shevchenko in his monument commemorating the millenium of Russia.  In 1863, the government banned the use of the Ukrainian vernacular. In 1868 the tsar consented to the construction of a statue to Hetman Khmelnytsky (1596-1657) in Kiev – but,   as a "unifier of Russia." The shift in opinion was reflected in the countryside where, by 1868, portraits of pro-tsarist Hetmans had disappeared from the Ukrainian nobles' reception halls.⁶⁹  When the government reinforced it earlier proscription of Ukrainian in 1875, it clearly showed it would not  allow loyal cultural nationalists to create a literary version of the Ukrainian vernacular and thereby  effectively associated that language with disloyalty.  Inevitably, the police also began to keep a close watch on, and arrest, romantically minded students who dressed as cossacks or wore the same embroidered linen shirts as did peasants.⁷⁰ With the triumph of hard-liners in ministries during the 1860s, official backing for loyalist non-Russian nationalism disappeared by the 1880s.  The government now proceeded to reinforce its political control non-Russian peripheral territories not through concessions, but  by adding to the existing administrative-legal centralization, cultural-linguistic centralization –  Russification.

The repression of cultural nationalists, however, also ensured that modern Ukrainian literature  became more than just a medium for  depoliticized nostalgia of the sort found in Gogol's Ukrainian novels. In the second half of the century Ukrainian became the medium for the nationalism of Shevchenko, an author whose works fused a romantic interpretation of the Ukrainian cossack past with the idea of modem political liberty - a link between history and current politics not in Burns or Scott. Official harassment also ensured that Mazepism did not turn into a harmless sentimental nostalgia, as did Jacobitism, but became, instead, a political precedent for radical nationalists. After 1905, the older generation of national activists still hoped to influence policy via tsarist grace and/or informal deals with moderates in ministries.⁷¹  Younger activists, meanwhile, had begun  demanding   political and cultural autonomy as a constitutional right.

CONCLUSION

The fates of Scotland and Ukraine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries illustrate the importance of laws and  institutions in shaping the national identity of stateless minorities. By the end of the eighteenth century favour, coercion, and economic circumstances had combined to link Scottish and Ukrainian elites to  the empires to which they belonged. War against common Muslim enemies (Turkey and Persia) also probably contributed as much to forging an imperial Russian loyalty among Ukrainians, as war against Catholic powers helped create the British identity for Scots. In an age when imperial and regional loyalties were still compatible, Walter Scott no doubt echoed the feelings of many countrymen when he wrote that while his heart was Jacobite, his reason was Hanoverian and loyalist. Similarly, Nikolai Gogol wondered whether his soul was Ukrainian or Russian.⁷² By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the legal, institutional, and political differences between Great Britain and tsarist Russia had produced profound differences between Scotland and Ukraine. Whereas Scotland’s inclusion into an English dominated Great Britain underlay  the emergence of a modern  Scottish identity, Ukraine’s inclusion into Rossiia  both impeded the emergence of a modern Ukrainian identity and destroyed the pre-modern civic-legal base of that identity.

One major difference lay in the degree of coercion each government could use against its population. In Great Britain, a minority made law and often overrode customs and traditions that the majority regarded as just. Vagabonds could be summarily punished by magistrates despite the Magna Carta. Yet, the fact that vengeful retribution against declared rebels had to follow the law precisely, even under Henry VIII, when England was poorer than its main continental rivals, cannot be ignored.⁷³  It was of no little importance to Scotland's fate after 1707 that it was part  a country in which law, institutions and public opinion  mattered and that according to that law and opinion it was not a colony. Unlike Jamaica or North America, Scotland was not subject to England by right of conquest; its political status was not subject to the will of the king or circumstances in London; and it was never ruled by military governors or viceroys. The crown had to make cases against specific persons and had to prove treason in open court. Cumberland, accordingly, knew using terror raised serious problems, and ministers did what they could to disassociate the government from  the excesses committed by troops in 1746. Although it mattered little to victims, historians should note that moderate opinion, law, and political circumstances probably restricted the scope of the killing in Scotland – which at least in numerical terms pales in light of the butchery of 1708-11 in Cossack-Ukraine – or  the massacres of 1857 in India.⁷⁴

In Russia, law gave no protection even to the noble minority as a group, and the tsars in any case were not subject to law. Restrained neither by law, institutions or opinion, Peter's punitive measures in 1708-11 probably claimed, proportionately, many more victims than did Cumberland’s in 1745-46, and were decisive in forcing a discontented elite to accept unfavourable terms of submission.  The Russian image of orthodox “Little Russia/Ukraine” as a “patrimonial land”  did nothing to prevent or mitigate the horrors Peter’s commanders perpetrated – which included sacking orthodox churches. In the nineteenth century, repression and then  officials' indiscriminate use of far reaching emergency legislation alienated educated Ukrainians. The government, swayed in the final analysis by hard-liners, failed to win the loyalty of cultural nationalists, forced them to choose between empire and nation, gave them reason for opposition, and provoked the boldest to become political radicals.

A second major difference between Britain and Russia lay in their respective political structures, which determined the fate of native institutions and  autonomy in peripheral territories. Scottish law, the church, city councils, and client networks,  the institutional base of national identity, were secured by treaty and  remained in place after 1707 because Britain had a non-interventionist constitutional monarchy that did not force integration. English "liberties" stipulated in the Union permitted distinctive Scottish institutions to function free of supervision. Until the centralization of the nineteenth century, Scottish courts, buroughs and the Church exercised authority independent of central ministries. The creation of distinctively dressed Highland regiments were also instrumental in creating the modern Scottish identity. Conditional loyalists could protest when they saw Parliament enacting laws intended to apply only in England and legally oppose parliamentary attempts to legislate in Scotland. Scottish institutions, consequently, were never identified with oppositionist or extremist politics, and thanks to them, Scottish national identity did not have to depend exclusively on radicals, language, or folk culture. Because the Union allowed a loyalist elite to preserve Scottish civil institutions and to use them to promote Scottish interests even when they formally  became part the central government, imperial loyalism was compatible with modern Scottish national identity which emerged despite Anglicization, railways, migration, commerce, political dependency, and the destruction of the clan system. Cultural nationalists, never censored, harassed or repressed, did damn the English, and lament the fate of the nation. Their distorted theatrical view of Scots as Highlanders which came to symbolize Scots in the popular mind, is mocked today as kitsch by political nationalists. Nevertheless, once British monarchs began to parade in Highland dress, they demonstrated that no element of Scottish culture carried a stigma of disloyalty any longer, despite a history of rebellion against English domination.

The tsars recognized no immutable rights within their realm and tolerated Ukraine's legal and institutional particularities merely as privileges dependent on their will and expediency. The Ukrainian elite enjoyed no legally defined rights that were contractually binding. They also had no central representative assembly in which to make appeals, and after 1709, they had to cope with a collective memory of terror as well as the indifference or hostility of an unconditional loyalist majority whose numbers grew  as the Hetmanate's institutions disappeared. Conditional loyalists who resisted administrative centralization became a minority that, by the mid-eighteenth century, could do little more politically than to try to convince the sovereign not to listen to those who opposed devolution and to protect or restore an autonomy in which fewer of their countrymen were interested with each passing generation. Insofar as such efforts maintained native institutions, they provided a civic basis for the Ukrainian national identity. Insofar as these efforts failed, they made  radical ethnic nationalism more likely in Ukraine. The courage of those who challenged the government in the nineteenth century undoubtedly helped create a community able to resist. But, in the absence of distinctive institutions, such as those Scotland possessed, calls for liberty and opposition to oppression alone could not create the balanced interaction between society and government that characterizes modern integrated democratic national states. The absentee Little Russian loyalist careerists in Petersburg and their poorer estate-bound cousins, finally, were unlike the absentee Anglicized Scottish careerists in London and their local agents, who could make personal profit out of being part of the  Union while preserving Scottish institutions and promoting economic modernization.

Although from the 1860s hard-line opposition to Ukrainian cultural nationalists was influential, moderates still provided the government with the option of sponsoring a loyalist Ukrainian cultural nationalism until the 1880s. Proscription beginning from 1847, however, created a stigma of disloyalty around the Ukrainian language and culture and limited them to private life. No tsar legitimized the external symbols of Ukrainian identity by parading in them. Arbitrary repression by ministers who regarded loyalism and Ukrainian national identity as incompatible, meanwhile, created fertile ground for radical political nationalists and undermined the credibility of moderate  activists, who, in the absence of distinctive laws and native institutions, had little choice but to build modern Ukrainian nationality on cossack romanticism and peasant culture. As positions hardened, the middle ground shrank. During and after the 1905 revolution even Russian liberals considered Ukrainian demands for territorial autonomy in the name of national self-determination to be extreme. No tsarist minister responded to Ukrainian demands with a statement that could be compared to Churchill's 1911 remark on Scottish Home rule: "There is nothing which conflicts with the integration of the United Kingdom in the setting up of a Scottish parliament for the discharge of Scottish business."⁷⁵

This is a revised and corrected version of a paper originally published in Comparative Studies in Society and History (July, 1997). The author presented and abriged version at the 2009 conference at the Mohyla Academy to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava.

Stephen Velychenko is Research Fellow, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto.

1.  .F. McLynn, The Jacobites (London, 1985). Highland chiefs who supported the Jacobites  resented their exclusion from the Argyll clan controlled government patronage network more than they did the Union.
2.  . While pro-French Poles encouraged Napoleon to consider establishing a Cossack duchy, he did not give the idea serious consideration, nor did he consider liberating serfs in the Russian empire.  The Terror and peasant emancipation limited the appeal of French ideas among Ukrainian nobles. M. le. Slabchenko, Materiialy do ekonomichno-sotsialnoi istorii Ukrainy XIX stolittia (Kharkiv, 1925), 74-102; V. Adadurov, ‘Napoleonida’ na Skhodi Evropy (Lviv, 2007); 0. Ohloblyn, Liudy staroi Ukrainy (Munich, 1959). W. Meikle, Scotland and the French Revolution (Glasgow, 1912); J. D. Brim, "The 'Scottish Jacobins,' Scottish Nationalism and the British Union," in R. A. Mason, Scotland and England 1286-1815 (Edinburgh, 1987), 247-61. B. Harris ed., Scotland in the Age of the French Revolution (Edinburgh, 2005)
3.  . T. Nairn, "Old Nationalism and New Nationalism," G. Brown, ed., The Red Paper on Scotland (Edinburgh, 1972), 22-57: T. C. Smout, "Problems of Nationalism Identity and Improvement in Later Eighteenth-Century Scotland," T. A Devine, ed., Improvement and Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1989), 1-20; J. M. Mackenzie, "Essay and Reflection: On Scotland and the Empire," The International History Review, no. 4 (November 1993), 714-39; G. Morton, "A Tale of Two States: Scotland in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," J. G. Beramendi, et al., Nationalism in Europe Past and Present (Santiago, 1993), 11:223-46; L. Paterson, The Autonomy of Modern Scotland (Edinburgh, 1994); 1. L. Rudnytsky, Essays in Modern Ukrainian History (Edmonton, 1987), 11-36, 91-141, 375-416.
4.  .M. Flinn, Scottish Population History from the 17th century to the 1930s (Cambridge, 1977), 313.
5.  .Cited in L. Colley, Britons (New Haven, 1992), 413.
6.  .T. Feodor, Patterns of Urban Growth in the Russian Empire during the Nineteenth Century, (Chicago, 1975), appendix 1.
7.  .In the eighteenth century and  earlier, per-capita income differentials within Europe, and between Europe and the rest of the world, were minimal. A huge gap between the richest and poorest countries begins to appear only in the nineteenth century. R. Bairoch, Economics and World History (New York, 1993), 102-8. H. J. Berman, Law and Revolution. The Formation (if the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 292-4, 455-6. Only recently have some Marxists stopped regarding all states as equally repressive and law and constitutions as "instruments of class rule." H. J. Berman, Law and Revolution, The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 292-4, 455-6. Marxists regarded all states to be equally oppressive and law and constitutions as "instruments of class rule." E. P. Thompson, Writing by Candlelight (London, 1980) and Poverty of Theory (London, 1978). Theories linking nationalism with industrialization cannot explain nationalism in countries where it preceded industrialization. M. Mann, "The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism"; J. A. Hall, J. C. Jarvie, eds., Transition to Modernity (Cambridge, UK, 1992), 139-63. On the shortcomings of "internal colonialism," a model that explains nationalism in terms of economic dependency: D. McCrone, Understanding Scotland, The Sociology of a Stateless Nation (London, 1992), 55-69.
8.  .V E. Durkacz, The Decline of the Celtic Languages: A Study of Linguistic and Cultural Conflict in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1983); J. Prebble, The Highland Clearances (London, 1963). P. Aitchison, A. Cassell, The Lowland Clearances. Scotland’s Silent Revolution 1760-1830 (Edinburgh, 2003).
9.  .English chroniclers and historians  to the eighteenth century claimed that Roman Britannia included all of Britain implying that when the Romans left imperial authority devolved to English kings. Scots chronicles and histories noted that Scotland had never been ruled by any southern authority. C. Kidd, Subverting Scotland's Past, Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity 1689- c. 1830 (Cambridge, UK, 1993). On the arguments of the Pro-English faction before the Union of Crowns: R. A. Mason, ed., Scotland and England 1286-1815 (Edinburgh, 1987) 60-92.
10.   G. Parker, Empire War and Faith in Early Modern Europe (London, 2002), 281-82.
11.  .Medieval continental rulers normally gave manorial and territorial autonomy in return for noble support. This left later monarchs with the problem of eliminating it. In England, nobles got power in a central parliament in return for enforcing the King's law on their manors and in the shires. M. Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia 1600-1800 (New Haven, 1983); R. Frame, The Political Development of the British Isles 1100- 1400 (Oxford, 1990); B. P. Levack, The Formation of the British State (Oxford, 1987); J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power (London, 1989); J. Bulpitt, Territory and Power in the United Kingdom (Manchester, 1983). B. I. Ingraham, Political Crime in Europe. A Comparative Study of France, Germany and England (Berkeley, 1979), 56.
12.  .Cited in Colley, Britons, 120. M. W. McCahill, "Peerage Creations and the Changing Character of the British Nobility, 1750-1850," English Historical Review, 96 (April 1981), 263. Compared to their English opposites, Scottish families had more sons and smaller fortunes. J. Hayes, "Scottish Officers in the British Army," Scottish Historical Review, 37 (April 1958), 29.
13.  .C. Kidd, "Enlightened Identity and the Rhetoric of Intention," in D. Allan, ed., Virtue Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1993), 148-60; Idem, "Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish Nationalist Inhibition 1780-1880," Scottish Historical Review (April 1995), 45-68.
14.  .J. S. Gibson, The Thistle and the Crown. A History of the Scottish Office (Edinburgh, 1985). A. Murdoch, 'The People Above' Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1980). J. S. Shaw, The Management of Scottish Society (Edinburgh, 1983). Whether or not Scotland was a dominated underdeveloped client of England is a major issue in modern historiography. See D. Szechi, "The Hanoverians and Scotland," in M. Greengrass, ed., Conquest and Coalescence (London, 1991), 116-33; McCrone, Understanding Scotland, 34-88; N. MacCormack, ed., The Scottish Debate (Oxford, 1970).
15.  .M. G. Pittock, The Invention of Scotland. The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity 1638 to the Present (London, 1991), 99-133
16.  .V. M. Kabuzan, Narodonaselenie Rossii (Moscow, 1963) 162-64.
17.  .In 1754, Empress Elizabeth decreed that native Russians should also be among the candidates for church office. 1. Ohienko, Istoriia Ukrainskoi kultury, 3rd ed. (Winnipeg, 1970), 93.
18.  . On whether or not Tsarist Ukraine was an economic colony of Russia see: V. 0. Holobutsky, Ekonomichna istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR (Kiev, 1970), 137-46; B. N. Mironov, "Eksport Russkogo khleba vtoroi polovine XVIII-nachale XIXV," Istoricheskie zapiski, no. 93 (1974), 173-88. K. Kononenko, Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations Between Ukraine and Russia (1654-1917) (Milwaukee, 1958); M. Spechler, "The Regional Concentration of Industry in Imperial Russia 1854-1917," Journal of European Economic History (Fall 1980), 401-29; idem, "Development of the Ukrainian Economy 18541917: The Imperial View," I. S. Koropeckyj, ed., Ukrainian Economic History (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 261-76; 1. S. Koropeckyj, Development in the Shadow: Studies in Ukrainian Economics (Edmonton, 1990), 43-111. S. Velychenko, “The Issue of Russian Colonialism in Ukrainian Thought,” Ab Imperio no. 1 (2002) 323- 66
19.  . S. Velychenko, National History as Cultural Process. A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine’sPast in Polish, Ukrainian and Russian Historical Writing from Earliest Times to 1914 (Edmonton, 1992), 148-60.
20.   Unlike Charles Stuart, Mazepa did not intend to fight. In 1708 no-one imagined that Sweden could lose to Russia and Mazepa planned to become a Swedish vassal after Charles had defeated Peter on Russian territory. When the Russians did defeat the Swedes and forced them to  march  into Ukraine in September 1708, their southern turn marked not the beginning but the end of Mazepa’s plans. There is no study of how much support Mazepa had that is comparable to J. K. Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688-1788 (Cambridge, UK, 1989). Assertions of loyalty to Peter in the autumn of 1708 were made overwhelmingly by the subjects of pro-Mazepa officers and reflected their understandable wish to avoid retribution. V. E. Shutoi, Borba narodkykh mass protiv nashestviia armii Karla XII (Kiev, 1959) 282. S. Pavlenko, Ivan Mazepa (Kyiv, 2003)  notes Ukrainians acted no different from other people in similar circumstances; some supported one side, some the other, and most kept their heads down and waited to see who would win.  An important difference between Scotland and Ukraine was that Charles’s French allies did not sent troops. Thus,  Scots did not face foreign troops  requisitioning in Scotland before Culloden. Requisitioning by the Swedes played a key role in alienating Ukrainians in the 10 months before Poltava
21.  . 0. Subtelny, The Mazeppists. Ukrainian Separatism in the Eighteenth Century (Boulder CO, 1981). The  most recent biography  of Mazepa is  T. Iakovleva,  Mazepa (Moscow, 2007)
22.  . Differences  between hardline officials who advocated Russification of non Russians, and moderates who argued that the government should support limited cultural autonomy, are analyzed in: W. Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy in the Western Provinces of the Empire (1863-1905) (Lublin 1998), A. I. Miller, ‘Ukrainskii vopros v politike vlastei i Russkom obshchestvennom mnenii, (St. Petersburg, 2000), R. Vulpius, “Ukrainskiii iazyk i shkolnoe obuchenie v posdneimperskii period,” Ab Imperio no. 2 (2005) 321-67.
23.  .Cited in: W. A. Speck, The Butcher. The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the '45 (Oxford, 1981), 127; J. Black, Culloden and the '45 (Phoenix Mill, UK, 1990), 193-4.
24.  .Historians have not determined the total number of deaths. The most important source from which an approximate figure could be derived is H. Paton, ed., The Lyon in Mourning, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1895). Six months after the battle spies in the western Highlands reported that 610 men were dead but did not specify whether they died at the hands of punitive detachments. C. S. Terry, ed., The Albemarle papers (Aberdeen, 1902), 1:337. After the 1857 Indian Mutiny, British troops, acting with extraordinary powers and arguably ignoring a clemency order, summarily executed thousands of suspected rebels. C. Hibbert, The Great Mutiny. India 1857 (London 1980), 166-7, 201-12.
25.  .G. Plank, Rebellion and Savagery. The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia, 2006), 62-64, 106-07.
26.  .J. Prebble. Culloden (London, 1961), 244-6. Speck, The Butcher, 173-7.
27.  .R. Mitchison, "Patriotism and National Identity in Eighteenth-Century Scotland," in T. W. Moody, ed.. Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence (Belfast, 1978), 73-87.
28.  .D. Zimmermann, The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and Exile 1746- 1759 (London, 2003) 38-47, 162-69. In 1759 the British Navy decisively defeated the French at Quiberon Bay.
29.  .These were subject only to repayment of sums paid by the government to clear their debts. V. Wills, ed., Reports on the Annexed Estates 1755-1769 (Edinburgh, 1973), XIV; A. J. Youngson, After the Forty-Five (Edinburgh, 1973), 26-27. The failure of these projects, the depopulation and transformation of the Highlands into pastures (the Clearances) after 1820, cannot be blamed on "English colonialism." Behind agrarian modernization lay falling agricultural prices, Scottish landlords influenced by the Scotsman Adam Smith, and laws passed by Scottish parliaments before Union. E. Hobsbawm, "Scottish Reformers and Capitalist Agriculture," in E. Hobsbawrn et al, Peasants in History, Essays in Honour of Daniel Thorner (Oxford, 1980), 7-19; T. M. Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War (Manchester, 1994), 38-41.
30.  .J. M. Simpson, "Who Steered the Gravy Train 1707-1766?," in N. T. Philipson, R. Mitchison, ed., Scotland in the Age of Improvement (Edinburgh, 1970), 49.
31.  .H. C. B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1977), 28-29; T. Hayter, The Army and the Crowd in Mid-Georgian England (London, 1978), 22-23. This assumes 10 sixty-man companies per regiment. Regiments at Culloden averaged 420 men.
32.   A. MacKillop, ‘More Fruitful than the Soil’ Army Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715- 1815, (East Linton, 2000).  To symbolize Scottish dependency, English or Lowlanders were made drummers in Highland regimental- bands,  and, contrary to prevailing practice, marched in the rear, behind the Scots pipers, rather than in front.
33.  .D. Szechi, The Jacobites Britain and Europe 1688-1788 (Manchester, 1994); F. McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth- Century England (London, 1989), 159-65; A Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans (Edinburgh, 1995), 58-65, 79, 84; B. Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen 1650-1784 (London, 1984), 108-14, 174, 178.
34.   G. Parker, Empire War and Faith,  168
35.  .C. Kidd, "North Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth-Century British Patriotisms," The Historical Journal, no. 2 (1996), 365, 378-9; idem, Subverting Scotland’s Past, 193-246.
36.  .Insofar as one article of the Treaty specified that Parliament could alter Scottish law, acts in conflict with the spirit of the Treaty can be construed as legal. From this perspective, changes in Scotland's status may be interpreted as legal renegotiations of the terms of Union and not as infringements of the Union and  loss of Scottish control over Scottish affairs. Legal alteration of the did not diminish Scotland's distinctiveness. T. B. Smith, "The Union of 1707 as Fundamental Law," idem, Studies Critical and Comparative (Edinburgh, 1962), 12-18; C. R. Munro, "The Union of 1707 and the British Constitution," in P. S. Hodge, ed., Scotland and the Union (Edinburgh, 1994), 98-104.
37.  .Smout, "Problems of Nationalism, Identity and improvement," 5.
38.   Pisma i bumagi imperator Petra Velikogo (Moscow, 1948) vol. 8 , 244, 875.
39.  .The relationship between politics and kinship within the Hetmanate elite is little studied. 0. Ohloblyn, Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba (New York, 1960), 288-319 lists which officers supported Mazepa.
40.  .On tsarist repression, see Ohloblyn, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, 322-3; Subtelny, The Mazepists, 37, 50. 0. Hrushevsky, "Hlukhiv i Lebedyn," Naukovi Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Tarasa Shevchenka XCII (1909), 51-65. S. Pavlenko, Zahybel Baturyna v lystopadi 1708 (Kyiv, 2007) 120, 126, 136, 169. The figure 900  is in Istoriia Rusov . The papers of the field court martials have apparently been lost. Unavailable to me  was:  T. G. Iakovleva,  “Ivan Mazepa v poiskakh politicheskogo resheniia letom-oseniu 1708 goda,” Belorussiia i Ukraina: Istoriia i kultura,  3  (2006).
41.  . M. Krykun, "Zhin naselennia z Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy v Livobereznu 1711-1712," Ukraina Moderna, (1996), 84-85. These evictions were done in the winter, and the empty towns and villages were razed.
42.  . Pavlenko, Zahybel, 172. Ivan Mazepa, 375, 406. The figure 30 000 probably includes military dead, but this is not indicated.
43.  .Russian reports on Ukraine before the Swedish invasion noted a covert struggle between pro-Polish and pro-Turkish factions. 0. Ohloblyn, Studii z istorii Ukraiiny (New York, 1995), 146-60. The Swedes also butchered Ukrainian civilians. But they, unlike Hanoverian troops in Britain or Romanov troops in the Hetmanate, in strictly legal terms, were foreign troops on foreign soil.
44.  .Pisma i bumagi, vol. 8 pt. 1, 267, 270, 274, 291-92.
45.  .  E. Anisimov, Vremia petrovskikh reform,  33.. The amnesty offer was made once, in a letter to Skoropadsky,  five days after Baturyn was razed. The threat of punishment was proclaimed in a manifesto disseminated not only in written form, but in approximately 5000 printed copies. Pisma i bumagi, vol. 8, 268, 933.
46.  . In Britain after 1628, seditious words were no longer tried as treason, and after 1650 hearsay evidence was inadmissible in court. By the 1720s torture was no longer part of the criminal procedure. C. Emsley, "Repression, 'Terror,' and the Rule of Law in England during the Decade of the French Revolution," English Historical Review (October 1985), 801-25; I. Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolution (London, 1993), 139-43; Mond, Jacobitism, 234.
47.  . In Muscovite practice “the people” had  a moral, not a legal right, to resist tyranny. A judiciary was formed in 1713, but anything deemed a political offence was dealt with initially by one of two chancelleries subject only to the tsar, and from 1718, the taina kantseleriia. J. Cracraft, "Opposition to Peter the Great," in E. Mendelsohn and M. S. Shatz, eds., Imperial Russia 1707-1917 (DeKalb, IL, 1988), 24-26. V. Valdenburg, Drevnerusskie uchenniia o predelakh tsarskoi vlasti (St. Petersburg, 1916).
48.  .L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XVIII veke (Moscow, 1958), 44-47, 327. J. L. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar (London, 1985) 138. This assumes that there were 1,200 men per dragoon regiment, 1,300 per garrison regiment, and 1,500 per militia regiment. Roughly 20 percent of these troops were in Kiev, where they comprised as much as 30 percent of the population. See A. Perkovsky, "Pro chyselnist naselennia m. Kieva na pochatku XV111 st.," Ukrainskvi arkheohra fichnyi shchorichnyk, 1 (1992), 144-52. The Hetmanate also maintained a cossack army of 50,000 and 6,000 men in land militia regiments.
49.  .In 1722 the Senate secretly instructed the resident Russian general to instigate Ukrainians to demand the introduction of Russian law. S. A Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen (Moscow, 1963), bk. IX: 524. N. P. Vasylenko, Materiialv do istorii Ukrainskoho prava (Kiev. 1929), 1: xi-xiii, xix; V. M. Horopets, Vid voitizu do inkorporatsii (Kiev, 1995), 53. B. Krawchenko, "Petrine Mercantilist Economic Policies toward the Ukraine," Koropeckyj, ed,, Ukrainian Economic Historv, 186-209.
50.  . Russians exploited legal ambiguities fully. For instance, in cases not covered by existing statutes, Ukrainian law permitted applying any other "Christian law"- and, of course, the Russians were Christian, Similarly, Peter interpreted the act of 1654 as providing cossacks with a legal right of appeal to Russian military governors and thereby justified his establishment of a supervisory body over the hetman in 1721 ("The Little Russian College," in Vasylenko, Materiialy do istorii Ukrainskoho vii, xiii, B. Nolde, "Essays in Russian State Law," The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, no. 3 (Winter-Spring 1955), 873-903: lakovliv, Ukrainsko-Moskovski dohovory, 138-60. On treason and homage, see 0. Subtelny, "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason," Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 2 (1978), 158-83 F. Maitland and F. Pollock, The History of English Law (Cambridge, UK, 1968), 1: 296-307, 11: 462-511). O.P. Backus, "Treason as a Concept and Defections from Moscow to Lithuania in the Sixteenth Century," Forschungen zur 0steuropaischen Geschichte, 15 (1970), 138-41; G. Alef, The Origins qfthe Muscovite Autocracy (Berlin, 1986), 73-76.
51.  .Velychenko, National History, 111-2; Z. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate 1760s-1830s (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 95-98, 32942. In 1765 and 1768, Russian officials reported from London that Americans considered new taxes invalid because they were passed by a government that denied them their right as British subjects to representation in Parliament. N. N. Bashkiria et al, The United States and Russia. The Beginnings of Relations 1765-1815 (Washington, 1980), 11, 15-17.
52.  .Kohut, Russian Centralism, 94, 221; V. A. Golobutskii, Chernomorskoe kazachestvo (Kiev, 1956) 168, 328. Little Russian cossack regiments were formed and disbanded ad hoc in 1812-16 and 1830-31.
53.  .1. DeMadariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (London, 1981), 154; M. Raeff, "Uniformity, Diversity, and the Imperial Administration under Catherine It," in H. Lemberg et al., Osteuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Vienna, 1977), 97-113; Konut, Russian Centralism, 126.
54.  .1. DeMadariaga, "Autocracy and Sovereignty," Canadian American Slavic Studies, no. 3-4 (1982), 380-7.   Montesquieu  was oblivious to the fact that Russia ruled non-Russians.  He presumably saw no contradiction in simultaneously advocating unequal rights for groups but no separate laws for subject peoples within empires because  he thought that led to imperial collapse and the birth of new nations. Catherine chose what she liked and ignored what she did not. M. Okenfus, “Catherine Montesquieu and Empire,” Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas no. 3 (2008) 326-29.
55.  .W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (reprint ed., Chicago, 1979), 1:9498. M. Raeff, "The Empress and the Vinerian Professor Catherine It's Projects of Government Reforms and Blackstone's commentaries," Oxford Slavic Papers (NS), 7 (1974), 18-41. Raeff notes that she ignored what Blackstone said about the limits of royal power. He does not mention whether she commented on Britain's Celtic fringe. In a report submitted to Peter in 1714 which recommended that he abolish Ukrainian autonomy, E. S. Saltykov invoked Britain as a model and mistakenly claimed that the English pursued the same policies in Scotland as in Wales and Ireland (Velychenko, National History, 111).  
56.  .L. Baranovich, Pisma (Chernigov, 1865), 53, 59; N. F. Sumstov, Lazar Baranovich (Kharkov, 1865), 86-99.
57.  .Kohut, Russian Centralism, 130-5.
58.  .N. T. Phillipson, "Scottish Public Opinion," in Phillipson, Mitchison, ed., Scotland in the Age of Improvement, 125-47; Smout, "Problems of Nationalism," 5.
59.  .Z. Kohut, "A Gentry Democracy within an Autocracy. The Politics of Hryhorii Poletyka (1723-1784)," Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 3-4 (1979-80), 507-19.  Patronage politics in St. Petersburg is discussed in B.Meehan-Waters, Autocracy and Aristocracy, The Russian Service Elite qf1730 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1982), 67-69, 157-60.
60.  .Cited in N. Storozhenko, "K istorii Malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i nachale XIX veka," Kievskaia starina, no. 10 (1897), 128. The request was made by Ukraine's Russian Governer-General, Prince Repnin.
61.  .T. Dickenson, Scottish Capitalism (London, 1980); L. Paterson, "Ane End of Ane Auld Sang: Sovereignty and the Re-negotiation of the Union," Scottish Government Yearbook (1992), 105-7. There is debate in Scotland concerning the degree to which Scottish nationality was the product of a civil society, rather than the British state, since the institutions involved were governmental.
62.  .How Highland symbols came to represent all Scotland is intriguing since it occurred  when commercialization was destroying the highland clan order and was sponsored by men who preferred to be modern landlords rather than traditional clan chiefs. J. Prebble, The King's Jaunt (London, 1988). On the social and intellectual background to the transformation, see R. Clyde, From Rebel to Hero. The Image of the Highlander 1745-1830 (Edinburg, 1995), 116-49.   MacKillop, ‘More Fruitful than the Soil’ Army, Empire, and the Scottish Highlands, points out that between  1756  and 1815 Scots landowners  introduced agricultural modernization programs  aimed at destroying the link between land and military service, while simultaneously claiming their troops were “traditional clan warriors” and dressing them accordingly. They pressed only landless labourers into their regiments, whereas traditionally, all members of the clan regardless of holdings to status served.
63.  .The Association demanded better local government under a renewed Scottish office, not political separation. After the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny, it decided it was more patriotic to dissolve itself than to press claims. Pittock, The Invention of Scotland, 99-115; G. Morton, "Scottish Rights and 'Centralisation' in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," Nations and Nationalism, no. 2 (1996), 270-3.
64.  .Ingraham, Political Crime in Europe, 168, 210; J. W. Daly, "On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia," Slavic Review, no. 4 (winter 1995), 614-28. Between 1881 and 1905, over 46,000 persons were banished from the Petersburg and Moscow provinces alone. In Ireland, between 1867 and 1903, roughly 200 were arrested for political crimes.
65.  .These issues are mentioned only in passing in 0. Ohloblyn, A History of Ukrainian Industry (Kiev, 1925; reprinted, Munich 1971); Slabchenko, Materiialy; A. J. Rieber Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia (Chapel Hill, NC, 1982). Througout the nineteenth century, at least 50 percent of the government officials in Ukraine were Ukrainian. See S. Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?" Russian Review, no. 2 (1995), 188-208.
66.  .Cited in G. Luckyi, Between Gogol and Sevcenko (Munich, 1971) 99.
67.  .Luckyj, Between Gogol and Sevchenko, 25-88; H. Troyat, Gogol (London, 1974), 58-86, 135; Kohut, Russian Centralism, 282-4. The Foreign Ministry presumably had a report about George II's trip to Scotland, since one of his closest confidants was Princess Lieven, the wife of the Russian ambassador to London.
68.  .The Brotherhood advocated a political federation of Slavic nations, not Ukrainian separatism. D. Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy 1847-1905: A Demographic Approach," European History Quarterly, no. 2 (April 1995), 181-208, identifies fear as a reason that inclined the ministers towards repressing rather than tolerating difference. Fear stemming from weak administrative control is also mentioned by A. J. Rieber, "The Reforming Tradition in Russian History," in A. J. Richer and A. Z. Rubinstein, eds., Perestroika at the Crossroads (New York, 1991), 4-17.
69.  .Anonymous, "lz proshedshei zhizni malorusskago dvorianstva," Kievskaia starina, no. 10 (1888), 153. D. Saunders, "Russia and Ukraine under Alexander 11: The Valuev Edict of 1863," The International History Review, I (February 1995), 23-51; 0. Levytskyi, Istoriia budovy pamiatnyka B. Khmelnytskomu v Kievi," Literaturnyi-naukovyi visnyk, no. 6 (1913), 467-83.
70.  .S. Yekelchyk, "The Body and National Myth Motifs from the Ukrainian National Revival in the Nineteenth Century," Australian Slavonic and East European Studies, no. 2 (1993), 31-59
71.  . Alexei Miller (‘Ukrainskii vopros’, 195) noted that in 1903 some ministers and members of the royal family appeared at a palace ball in Ukrainian cossack costume and claims this reflected a  strengthening of the “moderates” position.  He did not demonstrate that those who wore the costumes  were “moderates,” that they had planned to make a political gesture to Little Russia and Ukrainians, or that Ukrainian national activists thought that they were making such a gesture. The appointment of Sviatoslav-Mirskii as Interior Minister in 1904 did moderate cultural-national-education policy, but by 1909, this “liberalization” was  reversed.
72.  .P. H. Scott, "The Politics of Sir Walter Scott," in J. H. Alexander and D. Hewitt, eds., Scott and His Influence (Aberdeen, 1983), 208-14; E. Muir, Scott and Scotland (London, 1936), 144-8; Luckyi, Between Gogol and Shevchenko, 123.
73.  .Ivan IV (grozny) summarily killed at least 4,000 people as "traitors." The victims included all the members of a given family who could be caught. The courts of Henry VIII executed 308 individuals for treason. G. R. Elton, Policy and Police. The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell (Cambridge, 1972), 292, 385-99; R. Hellie, "What Happened? How Did He Get Away With It?" Ivan Groznyi's Paranoia and the Problem of Institutional Restraints," Russian Historv (Winter 1987) 214.
74.  .P. J. Marshall, "A Nation Defined by Empire," in A. Grant and K. J. Stringer, eds., The Making of British History (London, 1995), 215; S. S. Webb, The Governors- General. The English Army and the Definition of Empire 1569-1681 (Chapel Hill, 1979). Once out of office, ex-governors were liable to civil suits for official actions unless they had managed to obtain a royal pardon.
75.  .Cited in Pittock, The Invention of Scotland, 132; 0. W. Gerus, "The Ukrainian Question in the Russian Duma 1906-1917," Studia Ucrainica, 2 (1984), 157-76. Criminal statistics suggest that either the radicalization of Ukrainians on the issue of nationality was slow or that the government considered political nationalism less a danger than radical socialism. Next to the death penalty, the harshest punishment was penal exile to Siberia. Ukrainians comprised only 2.3 percent of those sentenced  between 1906 and 1909-the first years for which police statistics were broken down by nationality. B. Gruszczynska and E. Kaczynska, "Poles in the Russian Penal System and Siberia as a Penal Colony (1815-1914)," Historical Social Research, 4 (1990), 120.

^* cited in: E. Anisimov, Vremia petrovskikh reform (Leningrad, 1989) 60.